Product Defect Case Series
Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 796 P.2d 1092 (1990).
Product: Gas tank on a motorcycle
Injury: Physical injury
Mechanism of Injury: The gas tank came off during a crash, causing additional damage to the plaintiff
Nature of Defect:
Jury Verdict:
Issue on appeal: Whether a jury should know the negligence that led to an accident that exposed the plaintiff to the product defect. (The plaintiff was drunk)
Product Defect Law Categories: #ProximateCause
Result: Reversed and remanded. The jury is not to know that the plaintiff was drunk in a crashworthy case.
Case Quotes:
A manufacturer has a duty to design a reasonably crashworthy vehicle. Huddell v. Levine, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir.1976). In regard to the crashworthiness of a vehicle, once a court or jury determines that a design defect exists misuse precludes recovery only when the plaintiff misuses the product in a manner in which the defendant could not reasonably foresee. See Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Iowa 1980).2
Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 537, 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1990)
Negligent driving of a vehicle is a foreseeable risk against which a manufacturer is required to take precautions. Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So.2d 1049, 1052 (Fla.1981). Specifically, it is foreseeable that a plaintiff, who is intoxicated, will drive negligently and get in an accident since intoxication leads to a significant number of accidents yearly. Therefore, evidence of Andrews' intoxication is not relevant to whether a design defect in his motorcycle was the proximate cause of his injuries. See Cota v. Harley Davidson, A Div. of AMF, Inc., 141 Ariz. 7, 684 P.2d 888, 895–896 (App.1984).
Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 537, 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1990)
The trial court failed to distinguish between the proximate cause of Andrews' accident and the proximate cause of his injuries. Andrews' intoxication may have been the proximate cause of the accident. However, Harley Davidson's design, if it was as defective as Andrews contends, was the proximate cause of his injuries.
Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 537, 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1990)
Additionally, contributory negligence is not a defense in a strict liability case where the issue is whether the design of a vehicle is crashworthy. See Young's Machine Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 694, 692 P.2d 24, 25 (1984); Horn v. General Motors Corporation, 17 Cal.3d 359, 131 Cal.Rptr. 78, 83, 551 P.2d 398, 403 (1976). A major policy behind holding manufacturers strictly liable for failing to produce crashworthy vehicles is to encourage them to do all they reasonably can do to design a vehicle which will protect a driver in an accident. Hence, the jury in such a case should focus on whether *538 the manufacturer produced a defective product, not on the consumer's negligence.
Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 537–38, 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1990)
We conclude that the court committed prejudicial error when it allowed evidence that Andrews was intoxicated on the night of the accident to come before the jury. Evidence that a plaintiff's intoxication may have caused an accident is not relevant to the issue of whether there was a design defect or whether a design defect in his vehicle caused his injuries. The jury, however, may have concluded that Harley Davidson was not liable for Andrews' injuries, despite the existence of a design defect on his motorcycle, because Andrews was intoxicated on the night of his accident.
Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 538, 796 P.2d 1092, 1095–96 (1990)
Although a plaintiff consumer should know whether a product has been altered after he or she has received it, the manufacturer may obtain this information through discovery. A manufacturer of a product knows precisely how the product was manufactured, what condition it was originally in, and, if altered, the manner in which it may have been modified. Secondly, we conclude that it is unfair to force the plaintiff consumer to prove a negative, i.e., that the product was not altered. Therefore, we hold that the burden of proving that a product has been altered is on the defendant manufacturer in a products liability suit.3 See The Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 112(d) (1979); see also Shoshone Coca–Cola v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 444–45, 420 P.2d 855, 858–59 (1966); Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 671 P.2d 369, 372 (Alaska 1983).
Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 539–40, 796 P.2d 1092, 1096–97 (1990)
