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Product Defect Case Series

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 708 P.2d 297 (1985).

Product: 1970 Jeep CJ-5

Injury: Severe brain injury, paraplegia

Mechanism of Injury: Rollover

Nature of Defect:

  • Instability
  • Misrepresentation about product

Jury Verdict: 

Issue on appeal: Whether the trial court erred by refusing to give a punitive damages instruction.

Product Defect Law Categories: #PunitiveDamages

Result:

Case Quotes:

While we have held that an expert may not base an opinion on mere speculation or conjecture, we are satisfied that the facts on which Dr. Kaplan relied were not of this character. Dr. Kaplan carefully examined the accident scene and the physical evidence still there. He spoke with persons present at the scene on the morning the accident was discovered. These persons pointed out the location where Murray was found and the spot at which the Jeep came to rest. They also described the tire marks left by the *644 Jeep as it swerved out of control. To assess the damage done to the vehicle, Kaplan examined the appraiser's damage report and photographs taken of the vehicle after the accident. He also spoke with a subsequent owner of the Jeep, who had repaired it. Finally, the record reflects that Dr. Kaplan was familiar with the handling and rollover characteristics of the Jeep CJ–5, based upon his review of highway accident statistics, his study of other Jeep accidents, and his observation of numerous rollover tests involving the CJ–5.

On this basis, Kaplan concluded that Murray's Jeep began to roll while the vehicle was traveling at a speed of 25–30 miles per hour, that the rollover occurred while the Jeep was still on the road, and that the rollover was the result of the Jeep's defective design. While these conclusions, and the investigation which produced them, have been strenuously attacked by appellants, we believe the points raised affected only the weight and credibility of Kaplan's testimony, not its admissibility. See Krehnke v. Farmers Union Co-op. Ass'n, 199 Neb. 632, 260 N.W.2d 601, 607–08 (1977). On the record before us, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Kaplan to testify.

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 643–44, 708 P.2d 297, 300 (1985)


Although appellants have suggested a number of alternative causes of the accident, Murray was not required to negate them. Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp., 100 Nev. 443, 447, 686 P.2d 925, 927 (1984). The evidence he produced, though circumstantial, sufficiently established causation. Id. at 452, 686 P.2d at 930. The credibility of that evidence was a matter for the jury. Id. “In this case, as in most cases, positive proof either way is not available. Inferences must be drawn from the best available evidence produced by each side.” Shoshone Coca-Cola v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 444, 420 P.2d 855, 858 (1966).

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 644–45, 708 P.2d 297, 300 (1985)


At the outset, we have serious doubts about the relevance of the evidence. Appellants argue, for example, that Murray's asserted failure to use his seat belt was relevant to show comparative negligence. Pending a legislative declaration to the contrary, however, we have refused to apply notions of comparative fault in the context of strict products liability. See generally Young's Machine Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 692 P.2d 24 (1984).

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 645, 708 P.2d 297, 301 (1985)


As the district court concluded, injection of these issues into the case would have entailed substantial expert testimony and a corresponding increase in the length of the trial. Given the difficulties of proof, the district court undoubtedly concluded that litigating these questions would have confused the jury and unduly emphasized a single, relatively insignificant aspect of the accident. A trial court is vested with discretion to simplify the issues and limit the number of expert witnesses allowed to testify. NRCP 16.3 The court is likewise authorized to exclude even relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or result in undue delay. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 94 Nev. 241, 243, 577 P.2d 1234, 1235 (1978); NRS 48.035.4 We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's action.5

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 645–46, 708 P.2d 297, 301 (1985)


In Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970), we held that post-accident repair orders, though not admissible to show negligence, were admissible to prove the existence of a defect “or any other necessary element” of a cause of action sounding in strict liability. 86 Nev. at 416, 470 P.2d at 139–40.

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 646, 708 P.2d 297, 301–02 (1985)


We believe that NRS 48.095 has no application here. By its terms, the statute comes into play only where negligence or other “culpable” conduct is alleged. See Schelbauer v. Butler Mfg. Co., 35 Cal.3d 442, 198 Cal.Rptr. 155, 159, 673 P.2d 743, 747 (1984); Ault v. International Harvester Company, 13 Cal.3d 113, 117 Cal.Rptr. 812, 814–15, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150–51 (1975); Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc., 86 Cal.App.3d 768, 150 Cal.Rptr. 419, 421 n. 2 (1978) (construing statute similar to NRS 48.095). In a strict liability action, of course, culpability in the sense of fault need not be established. See Ginnis, 86 Nev. at 413, 470 P.2d at 138; Shoshone Coca-Cola, 82 Nev. at 441, 420 P.2d at 857. Had the legislature, in enacting NRS 48.095, intended “culpable” to denote simple legal responsibility, without regard to fault, we think it would have expressed its intention in unequivocal terms.

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 647, 708 P.2d 297, 302 (1985)


Additionally, it seems to us that the policy considerations which underlie NRS 48.095 are less compelling in the situation presented here than in the typical negligence case. Where the plaintiff has been injured by a defect in a sidewalk, for example, it may be realistic to suppose that the potential defendant will avoid making repairs, fearing that they might be construed as an admission of fault. But this assumption is not valid where the defect is in a product manufactured by the thousands. In such a case, “it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that [the] producer will forego making improvements in its product, and risk innumerable additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public image, simply because evidence of ... such improvement may be admitted in an action founded on strict liability for recovery on an injury that preceded the improvement.” Ault, 528 P.2d at 1152. Accordingly, while decisions on the subject are by no means unanimous, we believe the better rule is to allow admission of post-accident remedial measures in an action based upon strict liability. See, e.g., Schelbauer, 673 P.2d at 746–48 (post-accident warning); *648 Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 232 Kan. 654, 659 P.2d 799, 809 (1983) (design change); D.L. by Friederichs v. Huebner, 110 Wis.2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890, 903–05 (1983) (design change and warning); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 648 P.2d 519, 525 (Wyo.1982) (design change); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 257, 417 N.E.2d 545, 551 (1981) (design change); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir.1977) (warning); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 257 n. 7 (S.D.1976) (design change); Ault, 528 P.2d 1148 (design change).7

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 647–48, 708 P.2d 297, 302 (1985)


Finally, appellants contend that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that warnings need not be given against dangers which are generally known. While this is certainly true as a general proposition of law, see General Electric Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 365, 498 P.2d 366, 369 (1972), there was no evidentiary basis for the instruction here. Although Murray agreed with defense counsel that the CJ–5 “handled a little differently” than an ordinary passenger vehicle, there is no indication that he was aware of the Jeep's propensity to overturn. Nor is there any evidence that consumers generally were aware of the danger.9 A party is entitled to an instruction on every theory of his case that is supported by the evidence. Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 583, 668 P.2d 268, 271 (1983). Conversely, where such evidence is absent, the instruction should not be given. Id. at 583–84, 668 P.2d at 271; Village Development Co. v. Filice, 90 Nev. 305, 312–13, 526 P.2d 83, 87 (1974). We think this was the situation here.

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 649, 708 P.2d 297, 303 (1985)


We note that products liability claims are frequently submitted to the jury on both strict liability and negligence theories. In such a case, it may be appropriate for the trial court to instruct the jury that evidence of remedial measures may not be considered by the jury in its determination of the negligence claim. See Robbins, 552 F.2d at 795. This is an issue, however, that we need not and do not resolve.

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 648, 708 P.2d 297, 302 (1985)

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