Product Defect Case Series
Price v. Blaine Kern Artista, Inc., 111 Nev. 515, 893 P.2d 367 (1995).
Product:
Injury:
Mechanism of Injury:
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Full Case Text: Price v. Blaine Kern Artista, Inc., 111 Nev. 515, 893 P.2d 367 (1995)
Case Quotes:
Although it is well established that the doctrine of strict products liability does not exempt an injured plaintiff from proving the element of causation, we agree that “[p]roximate cause in a products liability case serves a somewhat different role than in a case sounding in negligence because that cause of action seeks to impute liability to the manufacturer not on the basis of his negligence but because the product is not reasonably safe as it was designed. The tie which proximate cause is to provide in order to impose legal liability must be between the design defect of the product and the injury—that is, the plaintiff must show that the design defect in the product was a substantial factor in causing his injury. “ Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 403, 450 N.E.2d 204, 209 (1983)
Price v. Blaine Kern Artista, Inc., 111 Nev. 515, 520, 893 P.2d 367, 370 (1995).
Moreover, we recognize that if a tortfeasor inflicts injuries on a plaintiff that are identical to what the plaintiff would have received notwithstanding some abstract defect in the involved product, the manufacturer may be absolved of liability; however, if the product defect was a substantial factor in producing the injury, thereby constituting a legal cause of the injury, the manufacturer will be held liable. See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298, 312 (1994).
Price v. Blaine Kern Artista, Inc., 111 Nev. 515, 520, 893 P.2d 367, 370 (1995).
Whether an intervening cause is also a superseding cause in a strict products liability action must be determined in light of the nature and extent of the injury attributable to the product defect, thus focusing on whether the harm is of a kind and degree that is so far beyond the risk foreseeable to the manufacturer that the law would deem it unfair to hold the manufacturer of the product responsible. See Soule, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d at 312 n. 9.
Price v. Blaine Kern Artista, Inc., 111 Nev. 515, 520, 893 P.2d 367, 371 (1995).
In that regard, an intentional intervening act by a third party which is both unforeseeable and the proximate cause of the injury may insulate the manufacturer of a defective product from liability. Volter v. C. Schmidt Co., 74 Ohio App.3d 36, 598 N.E.2d 35, 38 (1991).2 In the instant appeal, we must therefore consider whether *521 the injury suffered by Price was of a kind and degree that the trier of fact may find to be within the ambit of risk that BKA should have addressed in designing its product.
FN2 In this holding, the Volter court claims to express “the Supreme Court of Ohio's intent not to strictly apply to actions involving strict liability the rule in negligence actions that intentional torts constitute superseding causes.” Id.; cf. R.H. Macy & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co. 51 Ohio St.3d 108, 554 N.E.2d 1313 (1990) (source of the Volter court's conclusion, holding that if the intentional acts of a vandal merely contributed to injuries caused by a defective product, without removing the effect of the defective product, then the product manufacturer is completely liable for the damages).
Price v. Blaine Kern Artista, Inc., 111 Nev. 515, 520-21, 893 P.2d 367, 371 (1995).
For purposes of summary judgment, we note that Price's injuries were not the immediate result of the assailant's push. Rather, the shifting of the weight of the caricature mask was allegedly the immediate cause of Price's injuries, and the risk of such an occurrence and the resulting strain on Price's head and neck may be found to be within the realm of risks that should have been considered and addressed by BKA in the design of its product. In the final analysis, the initial cause of Price's fall appears to be of little consequence, considering the reasonable prospect that among the quantity of users of BKA's products, some of them will sooner or later fall for any number of a variety of reasons.3
FN3: One commentator notes that “[a] special problem arises when a plaintiff seeks to hold a manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from a design defect that did not cause or contribute to the initial accident, but rather only caused or contributed to the injuries.” M. Stuart Madden, 2 Products Liability § 14.6 (2d ed. 1988). This so-called “second impact” problem most often arises when an intervening cause triggers an automobile accident, following which an injured plaintiff seeks recovery from the automobile manufacturer, alleging an automobile design defect that has compounded the seriousness of the resulting injuries. Those cases that have allowed recovery under such a theory look to the foreseeability of automobile accidents in general as a basis for their conclusions, with no regard for the intent or fault of the actor who caused the first impact. See, e.g., Soule, 882 P.2d at 303.
Although of a notably smaller scale, the present facts implicate a similar line of reasoning. While diverse and specifically unforeseen third-party forces may act to cause a user of a BKA caricature mask to become imbalanced and fall, a reasonable jury may find legal causation where BKA has failed to protect a user of one of its products from the consequences of a fall in general, which, as with any given automobile accident, is certainly a foreseeable occurrence.
Price v. Blaine Kern Artista, Inc., 111 Nev. 515, 521, 893 P.2d 367, 371 (1995).
