Product Defect Case Series
Reingold v. Wet "N Wild Nevada, Inc., 113 Nev. 967, 944 P.2d 800 (1997) overruled by Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 134 P.3d 103 (2006).
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Full Case Text: Reingold v. Wet "N Wild Nevada, Inc., 113 Nev. 967, 944 P.2d 800 (1997).
Case Quotes:
This court has previously held that evidence of subsequent, similar accidents involving the same condition may be relevant on the issues of causation and whether there is a defective and dangerous condition. Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 415, 470 P.2d 135, 139 (1970). However, evidence of subsequent accidents may not be admitted to demonstrate a defendant's knowledge of the condition prior to the instant accident. See id.; B.E. Witkin, California Evidence § 353 (2d ed. 1966). Since Reingold's motion sought to introduce evidence of subsequent accidents for the purpose of proving Wet ‘N Wild's knowledge of the dangerous condition, the trial court was correct in denying the admission of the subsequent accidents as irrelevant on that issue.
Reingold v. Wet "N Wild Nevada, Inc., 113 Nev. 967, 969-70, 944 P.2d 800, 802 (1997) overruled by Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 134 P.3d 103 (2006)
ROSE CONCURANCE:
This court has held that “evidence of subsequent, similar accidents involving the same [condition] are relevant to causation and a defective and dangerous condition.” Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 415, 470 P.2d 135, 139 (1970). However, this holding was in reference to a strict product liability claim, not a negligence claim as is the one in the present matter. See id. In reaching its conclusion regarding subsequent accidents, this court was persuaded by the discussion in a California treatise which did not limit subsequent occurrences to only strict liability cases:
*972 “The relevancy of other accidents, whether prior or subsequent, depends on the purpose for which the evidence is offered. A subsequent accident would not be relevant on the issue of knowledge or notice of a possibly dangerous condition at the time of the injury giving rise to the action. But a subsequent accident at the same or a similar place, under the same or similar conditions, is just as relevant as a prior accident to show that the condition was in fact dangerous or defective, or that the injury was caused by the condition.”
Id. (quoting B.E. Witkin, California Evidence § 353 (2d ed. 1966)); see also B.E. Witkin, California Evidence § 389 (3d ed. 1986).
Additionally, Ault v. International Harvester Company, 13 Cal.3d 113, 117 Cal.Rptr. 812, 817, 528 P.2d 1148, 1153 (1974), held that the lower court did not err by admitting evidence of both prior and subsequent accidents to prove a defective condition or cause of the accident. The court noted that the purpose of providing evidence of the other accidents was to show that all the accidents, including the one in litigation, occurred due to the dangerous condition. Id.
The United States Supreme Court stated that:
[The other accidents] were proved simply as circumstances which, with other evidence, tended to show the dangerous character of the sidewalk.... The frequency of accidents at a particular place would seem to be good evidence of its dangerous character—at least, it is some evidence to that effect.
District of Columbia v. Arms, 107 U.S. 519, 524–25, 2 S.Ct. 840, 844–46, 27 L.Ed. 618 (1883) (emphasis added). Although the Court did not indicate whether the other accidents were prior or subsequent, I believe that the occurrence of either type of accident should be “good evidence of its dangerous character.” Id.
Reingold v. Wet "N Wild Nevada, Inc., 113 Nev. 967, 971-72, 944 P.2d 800, 803 (1997) overruled by Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 134 P.3d 103 (2006)
