Product Defect Case Series
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 808 P.2d 522 (1991).
Product: Box bailer
Injury: Hand crush
Mechanism of Injury: The employer had removed a safety screen that would have prevented the crush injury. With the safety screen removed, the employee was able to get his hand in the machine.
Nature of Defect: Design/Safety feature defect. The plaintiff alleged that the machine should not have been able to function without the safety screen in place.
Jury Verdict:
Issue on appeal:
Product Defect Law Categories: #Warnings #DesignDefect #SafetyFeature #Admissibility #SubsequentRemedialMeasures #IndustryStandard #StateOfTheArt #Regulations #ANSI
Result: Remanded
Case Quotes:
This court has already held that manufacturers can still be liable for a foreseeable misuse of a product in spite of an adequate warning. Crown Controls Corp. v. Corella, 98 Nev. 35, 639 P.2d 555 (1982). In Crown, the plaintiff was injured when a power lift stacker fell on him. This court determined that a manufacturer cannot be liable for an abnormal and unintended use of a product, but may be liable for a foreseeable misuse. Id. at 37, 639 P.2d at 557. Therefore, in spite of a warning, the defendant in Crown was still liable for a foreseeable misuse.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 138, 808 P.2d 522, 524 (1991).
The question before us now is when, in spite of an adequate warning, a manufacturer is still liable for a foreseeable misuse. When the defect in the product is the lack of a safety device, the misuse is often an accidental misuse. In these situations, a warning, although it adequately informs of the danger, is of no help to the consumer. Strict products liability law should not punish manufacturers for unanticipated injuries from reasonably safe products, but it should encourage manufacturers to take all measures to avoid accidents from product misuse. Therefore, we must require manufacturers to make their products as safe as commercial feasibility and the state of the art will allow.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 138, 808 P.2d 522, 524 (1991).
Many jurisdictions have adopted the rule that a manufacturer may be liable for the failure to provide a safety device if the inclusion of the device is commercially feasible, will not affect product efficiency, and is within the state of the art at the time the product was placed in the stream of commerce. Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91 Cal.App.3d 372, 154 Cal.Rptr. 122 (1979) (oil well pumping unit designed without adequate safety features may be considered defective). See also Fabian v. E.W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir.1978) (failure to incorporate a safety device *139 into a punch press renders manufacturer liable for design defect); Scott v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 26 Ill.App.3d 971, 326 N.E.2d 74 (1975) (manufacturer's liability for failure to put a safety guard on a press brake was a jury question); Fischer v. Cleveland Punch and Shear Works Co., 91 Wis.2d 85, 280 N.W.2d 280 (1979) (failure to interlock circuits on punch press created foreseeable risk of injury). These cases promote a compound goal of encouraging manufacturers to make products safe without unduly burdening them with excessive liability without fault.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 138–39, 808 P.2d 522, 524 (1991).
In Titus, supra, the court found a manufacturer liable when a child who was riding on an oil well pumping unit fell into the unguarded crank area. Even though the child's action was a misuse of the product, the court found the unit defective because it did not have a safety guard that would have prevented the injury. The court stated,
[A]ny product so designed that it causes injury created when used or misused in a foreseeable fashion is defective if the design feature which caused the injury created a danger which was readily preventable through the employment of existing technology at a cost consonant with the economical use of the product....
Titus, 154 Cal.Rptr. at 128. The Titus court recognized that factfinders must consider existing technology and commercial feasibility when evaluating whether a product is defective. Notwithstanding these factors, manufacturers are in the best position to include devices to make their products safe. If the technology is available, the cost is not prohibitive, and the product remains efficient, then a potentially dangerous product which lacks a safety device is in a defective condition.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 139, 808 P.2d 522, 524–25 (1991).
[A]ny product so designed that it causes injury created when used or misused in a foreseeable fashion is defective if the design feature which caused the injury created a danger which was readily preventable through the employment of existing technology at a cost consonant with the economical use of the product....
Titus, 154 Cal.Rptr. at 128.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 139, 808 P.2d 522, 524 (1991).
This case differs from Titus because here the machine that caused the injury had warning decals. However, a warning is not an adequate replacement when a safety device will eliminate the need for the warning. If manufacturers have the choice between providing an effective safety screen or simply placing a decal on the product, cost will encourage the latter. Therefore, Instruction 22A, which informed the jury that an adequate warning will always shield manufacturers from liability, is not a correct statement of the law. Instead, warnings should shield manufacturers from liability unless the defect could have been avoided by a commercially feasible change in design that was available at the time the manufacturer placed the product in the stream of commerce.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 139, 808 P.2d 522, 525 (1991).
Generally, a substantial alteration will shield a manufacturer from liability for injury that results from that alteration. Gasdiel v. Federal Press Co., 78 Ill.App.3d 222, 33 Ill.Dec. 517, 396 N.E.2d 1241 (1979) (employer's substitution of a significantly different starting mechanism on a punch press shielded the manufacturer from liability when the press malfunctioned). However, if the alteration was insubstantial, foreseeable, or did not actually cause the injury, then the manufacturer of a defective product remains liable. See Medina v. Air–Mite, 161 Ill.App.3d 502, 113 Ill.Dec. 785, 515 N.E.2d 770 (1987) (manufacturer of air press was not shielded from liability when the employer failed to install a safety device on the machine).
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 140, 808 P.2d 522, 525 (1991).
In this case, the causal connection between the absent safety screen and the injury is clear. Therefore, the question left to the jury is whether the employer's act of overriding the limit switch was a substantial alteration of the product.1
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 140, 808 P.2d 522, 525 (1991).
This court has recognized that prior and subsequent accidents are admissible in an action based on strict liability. Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 668 P.2d 268 (1983) (prior and subsequent mishaps are admissible to show faulty design); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970). In Ginnis, the plaintiff was injured in an automatic door. We held that evidence of prior and subsequent repair orders and subsequent accidents involving the same door were admissible to show a defective and dangerous condition and causation. Id. at 413, 470 P.2d at 139.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 140, 808 P.2d 522, 525 (1991).
Robinson tried to offer evidence of safety devices on analogous machines to show that the interlocking guard that Enterprise should have included in the baler had been available for many years. This court has recognized that alternative safer designs are a factor in determining the existence of a design defect. McCourt v. J.C. Penney Co., 103 Nev. 101, 734 P.2d 696 (1987). In McCourt, we reversed a defense verdict because the jury was not given the opportunity to feel alternative safer fabrics, even though the defense expert claimed that such fabrics were uncomfortable and therefore not commercially feasible. We noted that when commercial feasibility is in dispute, the court must permit the plaintiff to impeach the defense expert with evidence of alternative design. Id. at 103, 734 P.2d at 698. In this case, Enterprise's expert testified that the design was reasonably safe, and that it was the state of the art at the time it was built. Robinson should have had the chance to dispute that claim with evidence of alternative designs that were available at the time.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 140–41, 808 P.2d 522, 525–26 (1991).
To comply with federal standards promulgated in 1982, Enterprise changed the design of its baler to include an interlocking safety guard. NRS 48.095 provides that subsequent remedial measures are not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct. Therefore, the court below excluded evidence of these design changes.
However, this court had previously adopted the rule that such measures are admissible in strict liability actions. Jeep Corporation v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 708 P.2d 297 (1985). In Jeep, the manufacturer sent warning stickers advising consumers that their vehicles lacked adequate occupant protection in the tops and doors. We concluded that the public policy reason to exclude such evidence in negligence actions does not apply in strict liability cases. Id. at 647, 708 P.2d at 302. A producer will not forego making improvements if failing to do so will subject it to additional lawsuits. Therefore, the better rule is to admit post-accident remedial measures, and let the jury decide if the manufacturer should have known how to correct the defect at the time it built the product.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 141, 808 P.2d 522, 526 (1991).
Legislative or administrative regulatory standards are admissible as evidence of a product's safety. Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash.2d 645, 782 P.2d 974 (1989) (evidence of compliance with regulatory standards for asbestos products is relevant to the burden on the manufacturer to design a safe product); Walker v. Maxwell City, Inc., 117 Ill.App.3d 571, 73 Ill.Dec. 92, 453 N.E.2d 917 (1983) (ANSI standards for motorcycle helmet admissible whether promulgated before or after the helmet was made). Enterprise argued that standards promulgated after the baler was sold should be inadmissible because Enterprise could not have complied with a standard not yet in existence. However, Enterprise could offer evidence of the relevant dates, and thereby give the jury full knowledge of the surrounding circumstances.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 142, 808 P.2d 522, 526 (1991).
ANSI standards set design guidelines for manufacturers. The ramifications for failing to comply with a standard varies depending on the product and the nature of the industry. Enterprise could rebut any false presumptions a standard raises by informing the jury of the date the institute promulgated the standard, or by showing that the industry did not adhere to the standard when Enterprise sold the baler. However, these issues should go to weight, and not admissibility of the industry or regulatory standards themselves. Seward v. Griffin, 116 Ill.App.3d 749, 72 Ill.Dec. 305, 452 N.E.2d 558 (1983). In Seward, the trial court admitted federal motor vehicle standards even though some were newer than the vehicle. The appellate court appropriately left to the jury the determination of whether the manufacturer could have been expected to adhere to the equivalent of the standard. Id. 72 Ill.Dec. at 315, 452 N.E.2d at 568.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 142, 808 P.2d 522, 526–27 (1991).
In addition, post-manufacture industry standards are circumstantial evidence that alternative courses of conduct may have been available to an entire industry. D.L. By Friederichs v. Huebner, 110 Wis.2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983). In Huebner the court admitted evidence of post-manufacture industry standards which required manufacturers to include safety features on forage wagons. Id. 329 N.W.2d at 896. In finding that a whole industry may have been producing a defective product, the court stated, “the question is not whether anyone else was doing more, although that may be considered, but whether the evidence discloses that anything more could reasonably and economically be done.” Id. at 907 (quoting Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25, 35 (Neb.1979)). The best way to determine if a defendant should have built a safer product is to let the jury hear all the evidence relating to the course of conduct of both the industry, and the particular manufacturer.
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 142–43, 808 P.2d 522, 527 (1991)
