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Product Defect Case Series

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 686 P.2d 925 (1984).

Product: Steering Wheel

Injury: Paralysis below the waist

Mechanism of Injury:

Nature of Defect:

Jury Verdict:

Issue on appeal: Trial judge entered a JNOV  and dismissed the dealer

Product Defect Law Categories:

  • Burden of Proof
  • Public Policy
  • Res Ipsa Loquiter

Result:

Case Quotes:

In 1966 this Court adopted the doctrine of strict tort liability against the manufacturer and distributor of a bottled beverage. Shoshone Coca-Cola v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966). We set forth the rationale for this rule as follows:

[P]ublic policy demands that one who places upon the market a bottled beverage in a condition dangerous for use must be held strictly liable to the ultimate user for injuries resulting from such use, although the seller has exercised all reasonable care, and the user has not entered into a contractual relation with him. Perhaps the supporting policy reasons are best expressed by William L. Prosser in his article, “The Fall of the Citadel,” 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791, 799 (1966): “The public interest in human safety requires the maximum possible protection for the user of the product and those best able to afford it are the suppliers of the chattel. By placing their goods upon the market, the suppliers represent to the public that they are suitable and safe for use; and by packaging, advertising and otherwise, they do everything they can to induce that belief....”

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 447–48, 686 P.2d 925, 927–28 (1984)


We further quoted with approval Justice Traynor's observation that “Even if there is no negligence ... public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market.” Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring). Rather than proof of negligence, or privity, we held that the plaintiff's case in strict liability would simply consist of proof “that his injury was caused by a defect in the product, and that such defect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant.” 82 Nev. at 443, 420 P.2d at 858.

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 448, 686 P.2d 925, 928 (1984)


In Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corporation, 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970), we extended our ruling in Shoshone to the designers and manufacturers of all types of products. We further determined that a plaintiff established a sufficient case for the jury that a product was defective by showing that “it failed to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of its nature and intended function and was more dangerous than would be contemplated by the ordinary user having the ordinary knowledge available in the community.” Id. at 413, 470 P.2d at 138. Such a condition is, in the words of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A(1) (1965), “unreasonably dangerous.” See also Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 99 Nev. 47, 657 P.2d 95 (1983).

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 448, 686 P.2d 925, 928 (1984)


It has been held that “ ‘a specific defect in the product is not an essential element in establishing a cause of action,’ ” since “ ‘in the field of products liability the focus is on the product and not necessarily on its component parts.’ ” Kileen v. General Motors Corp., 36 Conn.Sup. 347, 421 A.2d 874, 875 (1980). When there is evidence of some dangerous condition, the “factfinder can find, where other identifiable causes are absent, that the mere evidence of a malfunction is sufficient evidence of a defect.” Id. 421 A.2d at 876.

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 449, 686 P.2d 925, 928 (1984)


In Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, Inc., 64 Ill.2d 570, 2 Ill.Dec. 282, 357 N.E.2d 449 (1976), which the district judge cited but declined to follow in the instant case, the defendant manufacturer alleged that the plaintiff had not made a sufficient case for the jury, when the plaintiff had offered evidence of a brake malfunction at the time of the accident. The automobile in question was approximately six months old and had been driven approximately 7,500 miles without any brake problems. Plaintiff's daughter testified that she had experienced a temporary brake failure. Plaintiff testified that the brakes went out completely several hours later on the same day while the car was being driven carefully at a reasonable rate of speed, on dry roads and in good weather. Plaintiff did not offer any expert testimony concerning the presence of a specific defect, while defendant's expert testified that there was no defect. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed judgment for plaintiff, holding that both a defect and its existence when it left the manufacturer were established by proof that the product failed to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of its nature and intended function, in the absence of abnormal use or reasonable secondary causes. The failure of the brakes to function in the manner reasonably to be expected, in itself and without more, established the defect.

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 449, 686 P.2d 925, 928–29 (1984)


In the leading and oft-cited case of Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., supra, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir.1969), affirming 283 F.Supp. 978 (W.D.Pa.1967), the plaintiff was injured when a magnetic steel piler malfunctioned while being used as it was *450 intended to be used. The defendants, the manufacturer and seller of the piler, contended that plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of showing the existence of a defect at the time of sale. The only evidence of a defect was that the machine malfunctioned, and was a relatively new machine, having been in operation about six months prior to the accident.

The Court of Appeals, applying Pennsylvania law, held that a defective condition is established, “within the meaning of [Restatement (Second) of Torts] Section 402A by proving that the product functioned improperly in the absence of abnormal use and reasonable secondary causes,” 407 F.2d at 89–90. Although defendants contended that an electrical problem in the control panel, which defendants neither manufactured nor supplied, caused the malfunction, the Court of Appeals held that the jury could nevertheless properly have inferred that the malfunction was caused by a defect in defendants' product. Id. at 91 n. 7.

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 449–50, 686 P.2d 925, 929 (1984)


Other courts have had occasion to apply these principles to the malfunctioning of the steering or control mechanism of a car. In Vanek v. Kirby, 253 Or. 494, 450 P.2d 778, rehearing denied, 253 Or. 494, 454 P.2d 647 (1969), plaintiff was unable to allege a specific defect in his pleading, but alleged that while riding as a passenger in a new Ford automobile he became injured when the vehicle became “uncontrollable in normal operation” and left the highway. Id. 450 P.2d at 780. The court held that proof of these allegations would support a recovery and therefore the complaint stated a cause of action.

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 450, 686 P.2d 925, 929 (1984)


Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 332 F.Supp. 901 (W.D.Pa.1971), aff'd, 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir.1973), also involved evidence similar to that at bar in that plaintiff's employee was driving a new (2-day old) tractor-trailer combination which left the highway, causing loss of the property. The driver testified that he felt the right front wheel give way and he then lost steering control. Construing the law under Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, the District Court said that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the accident was caused by a malfunction of the steering mechanism. 332 F.Supp. at 903. The court held that “evidence of a malfunction of a vehicle is sufficient to establish liability without proof of the specific defect causing the malfunction.” Id.

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 450, 686 P.2d 925, 929 (1984)


On the facts presented in this case, we conclude that evidence of a steering malfunction which resulted in the driver losing control of the vehicle might properly be accepted by the trier of fact as sufficient circumstantial proof of a defect, or an unreasonably dangerous condition, without direct proof of the mechanical cause of the malfunction.1

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 450–51, 686 P.2d 925, 929 (1984)


We agree with the Supreme Court of Oregon that when the plaintiff has presented circumstantial evidence that a defect caused the accident in question, the credibility of such evidence is an issue to be left to the jury. “If the jury believes plaintiffs' evidence, the defendants, as is true in any case when the jury initially believes the plaintiffs' evidence, must come forward and convince the jury that the plaintiffs' evidence is incorrect, or the inferences to be drawn from plaintiffs' evidence do not lead to the conclusion that a defect in the vehicle was the cause of the damage.” Brownell v. White Motor Corporation, supra, 490 P.2d at 186. Defendants are not entitled to short-circuit the normal adversary process by convincing the court, rather than the jury, of the virtue of their position.

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 452, 686 P.2d 925, 930 (1984)


In commenting upon the trial court's proper role in considering a 41(b) motion, this Court has held:

There may well be merit to defendant's theory of the case, but the function of the trial judge is not to determine the respective merits.... It is not for him to weigh or compare or balance the inferences in favor of the one party and against the other. Conflicting inferences from known facts are for jury determination.

Roche v. Schartz, 82 Nev. 409, 412–13, 419 P.2d 779, 781 (1966).

Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 452, 686 P.2d 925, 930 (1984)

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