Ultra Hazardous or Abnormally Dangerous Activities
Slander of title requires:
1) false and malicious communications;
2) disparaging to one’s land; and
3) special damaged arising therefrom. Executive Management, Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. 962 P.2d 465, 478 (Nev.1998).
Robinson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Case No. 2:10-CV-321 JCM , 2010 WL 2834895, *2 (D. Nev. 2010).
1) words spoken about property are false;
2) they are spoken maliciously by defendant; and
3) the plaintiff sustains some special pecuniary damage as the direct and natural result of the words having been spoken.
Potosi Zinc Co. v. Mahoney, 36 Nev. 390, 1082, 135 P. 1078 (1913).
See also Executive Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 823, 842, 963 P.2d 465, 478 (1998) and DeCarnelle v. Guimont, 101 Nev. 412, 705 P.2d 650 (1985).
To prove malice, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Rowland v. Lepire, 99 Nev. 308, 313, 662 P.2d 1332, 1335 (1983). Conversely, “[w]here a defendant has reasonable grounds for belief in his claim, he has not acted with malice.” Id. “Additionally, evidence of a defendant’s reliance on the advice of counsel tends to negate evidence of malice.” Id.
“The district court’s award of attorney’s fees as special damages is discretionary, not mandatory.”
Day v. W. Coast Holdings, Inc., 101 Nev. 260, 265, 699 P.2d 1067, 1071 (1985).
There is authority that a complaint for slander of title is subject to dismissal if it fails to allege the loss of a particular pending sale. There is also authority that where plaintiff has alleged and shown that a pending sale was aborted by publication of disparaging matter, special pecuniary damage is established.
Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 98 Nev. 528, 531, 655 P.2d 513, 515 (1982).
We believe the rationale of Chesebro, Dowse, Paulson and Den-Gar is based on reason and recognizes that but for the wrongful act of slander of plaintiff’s title, the plaintiff would not incur any expenses in removing the cloud from his title. Dowse v. Doris Trust, supra, at 959. Furthermore, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 633(1)(b) (1977) is in accord with this view. Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that an award of expenses was an element of special damages and sufficient to establish the tort of slander of title.
Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 98 Nev. 528, 532, 655 P.2d 513, 515 (1982).
“The clear majority rule is that attorney fees incurred in removing spurious clouds from a title qualify as special damages in an action for slander of title. As stated by the Washington Supreme Court, attorney fees are permissible as special damages in slander of title actions because ‘the defendant … by intentional and calculated action leaves the plaintiff with only one course of action: that is, litigation…. Fairness requires the plaintiff to have some recourse against the intentional malicious acts of the defendant.’ However, no authority appears to support the proposition that attorney fees are available as special damages in a case to remove a cloud upon title when no claim for slander of title has been alleged, and in fact, authority to the contrary exists.” Horgan v. Felton, 123 Nev. 577, 585–86, 170 P.3d 982, 987–88 (2007).
“Where a defendant has reasonable grounds for belief in his claim, he has not acted with malice.” Rowland v. Lepire, 99 Nev. 308, 313, 662 P.2d 1332, 1335 (1983). “Additionally, evidence of a defendant’s reliance on the advice of counsel tends to negate evidence of malice.” Id.
In Nevada, [a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property, adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.”
NRS § 40.010.
Such an action [of quiet title] requests a judicial determination of all adverse claims to disputed property. Clay v. Scheeline Banking & Trust Co., 40 Nev. 9, 159 P. 1081, 1082-83 (1916).
Del Webb Conservation Holding Corp. v. Tolman, 44 F.Supp.2d 1105, 1109-10 (D. Nev. 1999).
In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove good title in himself. See, e.g., Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, 51 Cal.2d 702, 336 P.2d 525 (1959); Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Company, 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145, 146 (1973). Moreover, there is a presumption in favor of the record titleholder. Cf. Biasi v. Leavitt, 101 Nev. 86, 89-90, 692 P.2d 1301, 1304 (1985) (adverse possession claimant has the burden of establishing claim “by clear and competent proof in order to overcome the presumption that possession of the land is under the regular title”).
Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 112 Nev. 663, 669, 918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996).
[A quiet title claim requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant is unlawfully asserting an adverse claim to title to real property.] Union Mill v. Mining Co. v. Warren, 82 F. 519, 520 (D.Nev.1897).
Quiet title action is the proper method by which to adjudicate disputed ownership of real property rights. SeeHowell v. Ricci, 197 P.3d 1044, 1046 n. 1 (Nev.2008). Though not properly a cause of action, an action to quiet title is an equitable proceeding in which a party seeks to settle a dispute over ownership of property or to remove a cloud upon his title to the property. MacDonald v. Krause, 77 Nev. 312, 317-18, 362 P.2d 724 (Nev.1961). While not addressed by the Nevada Supreme Court, a widely accepted rule in such actions is that the party must tender the undisputed amount due and owing to challenge the validity of a sale or title to the property. See,e.g., Abdallah v. United Savings Bank, 43 Cal.App. 4th 1101, 1109 (1996). In essence, under the Tender Rule, he who seeks equity must do equity. SeeMcQuiddy v. Ware, 87 U.S. 14, 19 (1873). This was clearly a factor to the Nevada Supreme Court when it ruled in a favor of a party challenging a sale on their property due to past due taxes. Provenzano v. Clark County, 73 Nev. 348, 353 (1957) (“Plaintiff’s action was to quiet title to the property involved, accompanied by a tender to pay all taxes.”).
Joyner v. Bank of America Home Loans, Case No. 2:09-CV-2406-RCJ-RJJ 2010 WL 2953969 (D. Nev. 2010).
A quiet title claim requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant is unlawfully asserting an adverse claim to title to real property. Union Mill v. Mining Co. v. Warren, 82 F. 519, 520 (D.Nev.1897); Clay v. Cheeline Banking & Trust Co., 40 Nev. 9, 159, 159 P. 1081 (1916). Kemberling v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Case No. 2:09-CV-00567-RCJ-LRL, 2009 WL 5039495 (D. Nev. 2009).
“The essential elements of quasi contract are a benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff, appreciation by the defendant of such benefit, and acceptance and retention by the defendant of such benefit under circumstances such that it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment of the value thereof.”
Unionamerica Mtg. v. McDonald, 97 Nev. 210, 212, 626 P.2d 1272, 1273 (1981) (quoting Dass v. Epplen, 162 Colo. 60, 424 P.2d 779, 780 (1967)).
NRS 40.140 Nuisance defined; action for abatement and damages; exceptions.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this section:
2. It is presumed:
3. A shooting range does not constitute a nuisance with respect to any noise attributable to the shooting range if the shooting range is in compliance with the provisions of all applicable statutes, ordinances and regulations concerning noise:
4. As used in this section:
[1911 CPA § 562; RL § 5504; NCL § 9051]—(NRS A 1985, 873; 1997, 951, 1471, 1472; 2007, 3128)
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from 114 his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 114 Nev. 1468, 1483-84, 970 P.2d 98, 109 (1998) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A (1979)).
Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nev. 441, 449, 956 P.2d 1382, 1387 (1998); Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Nevada, 94 Nev. 131, 134, 575 P.2d 938, 940 (1978).
“The intention that is necessary to make the rule stated in this Section applicable is the intention of the promisor when the agreement was entered into. The intention of the promisor not to perform an enforceable or unenforceable agreement cannot be established solely by proof of its nonperformance, nor does his failure to perform the agreement throw upon him the burden of showing that his nonperformance was due to reasons which operated after the agreement was entered into. The intention may be shown by any other evidence that sufficiently indicates its existence, as, for example, the certainty that he would not be in funds to carry out his promise.” REST 2d TORTS § 530, comment d.
A plaintiff has the burden of proving each element of fraud claim by clear and convincing evidence. Albert H. Wohlers & Co. v. Bartgis, 114 Nev. 1249, 1260, 969 P.2d 949, 957 (1998);Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 110–11, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1992); Lubbe v. Barba, 91 Nev. 596, 540 P.2d 115 (1975).
“Whether these elements are present in a given case is ordinarily a question of fact.” Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 211, 719 P.2d 799, 802 (1986).
“Further, ‘[w]here an essential element of a claim for relief is absent, the facts, disputed or otherwise, as to other elements are rendered immaterial and summary judgment is proper.’ Bulbman, 108 Nev. at 111, 825 P.2d at 592.” Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nev. 441, 447, 956 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1998).
“‘[f]raud is never presumed; it must be clearly and satisfactorily proved.’” J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 120 Nev. 277, 291, 89 P.3d 1009, 1018 (2004) (quoting Havas v. Alger, 85 Nev. 627, 631, 461 P.2d 857, 860 (1969)).
“the essence of any misrepresentation claim is a false or misleading statement that harmed [the plaintiff].” Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 123 Nev. 362, 168 P.3d 73, 82 (2007).
Estimates and opinions are not false representations. Commendatory sales talk (puffing) isn’t either.
“Nevada Bell’s representations to Bulbman about the cost of Centrex and the installation time are estimates and opinions based on past experience with the system. As such, these representations are not actionable in fraud. See Clark Sanitation v. Sun Valley Disposal, 87 Nev. 338, 487 P.2d 337 (1971). Nevada Bell’s representations as to the reliability and performance of the system constitute mere commendatory sales talk about the product (‘puffing’), also not actionable in fraud. See e.g., Coy v. Starling, 53 Or.App. 76, 630 P.2d 1323 (1981). Furthermore, in his deposition, Gerald Roth, Jr., testified that he did not believe Nevada Bell had intentionally lied to him about its Centrex system. Rather, Roth stated that Nevada Bell might have been ‘more careful’ in making certain representations, particularly with respect to how long it would take to install a Centrex system. Roth’s testimony establishes the absence of fraudulent intent on the part of Nevada Bell.” Bulbman, Inc. v. Nev. Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 111, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1992).
“An estimate is an opinion and an estimate of value is an opinion as to value upon which reasonable and honorable men may hold differing views. This is the basis for the frequently announced rule that a charge of fraud normally may not be based upon representations of value. Frankfurt v. Wilson, 353 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Civ.App.1961); Burke v. King, 176 Okl. 625, 56 P.2d 1185 (1936).” Clark Sanitation, Inc. v. Sun Valley Disposal Co., 87 Nev. 338, 341, 487 P.2d 337, 339 (1971).
“Story, in his work on contracts, in discussing the various questions presented by the misrepresentations of the vendor, lays down the rule as follows: ‘If the seller fraudulently misrepresents facts, or states facts to exist which he knows not to exist, his fraud would vitiate the contract, provided the misstatements were in respect to a material point.’ (Section 636.) But where a statement is not made as a fact, but only as an opinion, the rule is quite different. Thus a false representation as to a mere matter of opinion * * * does not avoid the contract. * * * Ordinarily, a naked statement of opinion is not a representation on which a buyer is legally entitled to rely, unless, perhaps, in some special cases where peculiar confidence or trust is created between the parties. The ground of this rule is, probably, the impracticability of attempting to discover by means of the rules of law the real opinion of the party making the representation, and also because a mere expression of opinion does not alter facts, though it may bias the judgment. Mere expressions of opinion are not, therefore, considered so tangible a fraud as to form a ground of avoidance of a contract, even though they be falsely stated. * * * Yet, where a representation is made, going to the essence of a contract, the party making it should be careful to state it as an opinion, and not as a fact of which he has knowledge, or he may be liable thereon. The question whether a statement was intended to be given as an opinion, and was so received, is, however, one for a jury to determine, upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. But whenever a belief is asserted, as in a fact, which is material or essential, and which the person asserting knows to be false, and the statement is made with an intention to mislead, it is fraudulent and affords a ground of relief.’” Banta v. Savage, 12 Nev. 151, 0–4 (1877).
Misrepresentations may be implied
“a defendant may be found liable for misrepresentation even when the defendant does not make an express misrepresentation, but instead makes a representation which is misleading because it partially suppresses or conceals information. See American Trust Co. v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal.2d 42, 98 P.2d 497, 508 (1940). See also Northern Nev. Mobile Home v. Penrod, 96 Nev. 394, 610 P.2d 724 (1980); Holland Rlty. v. Nev. Real Est. Comm’n, 84 Nev. 91, 436 P.2d 422 (1968).” Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 212–13, 719 P.2d 799, 803 (1986).
False statement may be conveyed through an agent
“a party may be held liable for misrepresentation where he communicates misinformation to his agent, intending or having reason to believe that the agent would communicate the misinformation to a third party. See generally W. Prosser, supra, § 107 at 703; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 533 (1977).” Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 212, 719 P.2d 799, 803 (1986).
There is a duty to disclose where the defendant alone has knowledge of material facts not accessible ot the plaintiff
“Finally, with regard to the leakage problem, respondents argue that no affirmative representation was ever made that the house was free of leaks. At least implicitly, they argue that an action in deceit will not lie for nondisclosure. This has, indeed, been described as the general rule. Seediscussion, W. Prosser, supra, § 106, at 695-97. An exception to the rule exists, however, where the defendant alone has knowledge of material facts which are not accessible to the plaintiff. Under such circumstances, there is a duty of disclosure. Thus, in Herzog v. Capital Co., supra, the court upheld a jury’s award of damages to the purchaser of a leaky house, holding under the circumstances of that case, that the jury correctly found that the vendor had a duty to reveal ‘the hidden and material facts’ pertaining to the leakage problem. Id. at 10. In numerous other cases, involving analogous facts, a jury’s finding of a duty of disclosure has been upheld. See, e.g., Barder v. McClung, 93 Cal.App.2d 692, 209 P.2d 808 (1949) (vendor failed to disclose fact that part of house violated city zoning ordinances); Rothstein v. Janss Inv. Corporation, 45 Cal.App.2d 64, 113 P.2d 465 (1941) (vendor failed to disclose fact that land was filled ground).” Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 213, 719 P.2d 799, 803–804 (1986).
‘Intent to Induce the Plaintiff ‘to Act or Refrain from Acting
The intent to defraud must exist at the time the promise is made.
“The mere failure to fulfill a promise or perform in the future, however, will not give rise to a fraud claim absent evidence that the promisor had no intention to perform at the time the promise was made. Webb v. Clark, 274 Or. 387, 546 P.2d 1078 (1976).” Bulbman, Inc. v. Nev. Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 112, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1992).
“Intent must be specifically alleged.” Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 75, 110 P.3d 30, 51 (2005); seealsoTahoe Village Homeowners v. Douglas Co., 106 Nev. 660, 663, 799 P.2d 556, 558 (1990) (upholding the dismissal of an intentional tort complaint that failed to allege intent).
‘[F]raud is not established by showing parol agreements at variance with a written instrument and there is no inference of a fraudulent intent not to perform from the mere fact that a promise made is subsequently not performed. 24 Am.Jur. 107; 23 Am.Jur. 888.” Tallman v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 66 Nev. 248, 259, 208 P.2d 302, 307 (1949).
“It is only when independent facts constituting fraud are first proven that parol evidence is admissible. ‘Our conception of the rule which permits parol evidence of fraud to establish the invalidity of the instrument is that it must tend to establish some independent fact or representation, some fraud in the procurement of the instrument, or some breach of confidence concerning its use, and not a promise directly at variance with the promise of the writing. We find apt language in Towner v. Lucas’ Ex’r, 54 Va. (13 Grat.) 705, 716, in which to express our conviction: ‘It is reasoning in a circle, to argue that fraud is made out, when it is shown by oral testimony that the obligee contemporaneously with the execution of a bond promised not to enforce it. Such a principle would nullify the rule: for conceding that such an agreement is proved, or any other contradicting the written instrument, the party seeking to enforce the written agreement according to its terms, would always be guilty of fraud. The true question is, Was there any such agreement? And this can only be established by legitimate testimony. For reasons founded in wisdom and to prevent frauds and perjuries, the rules of the common law exclude such oral testimony of the alleged agreement; and as it cannot be proved by legal evidence, the agreement itself in legal contemplation cannot be regarded as existing in fact. Neither a court of law or of equity can act upon the hypothesis of fraud where there is no legal proof of it.’’ Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’s v. Pendergrass, 4 Cal.2d 258, 48 P.2d 659, 661.” Tallman v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 66 Nev. 248, 258–59, 208 P.2d 302, 307 (1949).
The false representation must have played a material and substantial role in the plaintiff’s decisionmaking, and made him make a decision he would not otherwise have made.
“In order to establish justifiable reliance, the plaintiff is required to show the following:’The false representation must have played a material and substantial part in leading the plaintiff to adopt his particular course; and when he was unaware of it at the time that he acted, or it is clear that he was not in any way influenced by it, and would have done the same thing without it for other reasons, his loss is not attributed to the defendant.’ Lubbe v. Barba, 91 Nev. 596, 600, 540 P.2d 115, 118 (1975) (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts, 714 (4th ed. 1971)) (emphasis added).” Blanchard v. Blanchard, 108 Nev. 908, 911, 839 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1992).
If the plaintiff made independent investigations and discovered facts that he is now claiming the defendant disclosed, he cannot be said to have justifiably relied on any of the defendant’s statements.
“Generally, a plaintiff making ‘an independent investigation will be charged with knowledge of facts which reasonable diligence would have disclosed. Such a plaintiff is deemed to have relied on his own judgment and not on the defendant’s representations.’ Id. at 211, 719 P.2d at 803 (citingFreeman v. Soukup, 70 Nev. 198, 265 P.2d 207 (1953)). However, we also recognize that ‘an independent investigation will not preclude reliance where the falsity of the defendant’s statements is not apparent from the inspection, where the plaintiff is not competent to judge the facts without expert assistance, or where the defendant has superior knowledge about the matter in issue.’ Id. 102 Nev. at 211-12, 719 P.2d at 803 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).” Blanchard v. Blanchard, 108 Nev. 908, 912, 839 P.2d 1320, 1323 (1992).
Where falsity of defendant’s statements is not apparent from the inspection, the plaintiff will not be charged with this knowledge.<span style=” color: white; ” />
“We have previously held that a plaintiff who makes an independent investigation will be charged with knowledge of facts which reasonable diligence would have disclosed. Such a plaintiff is deemed to have relied on his own judgment and not on the defendant’s representations. See Freeman v. Soukup, 70 Nev. 198, 265 P.2d 207 (1953). Nevertheless, an independent investigation will not preclude reliance where the falsity of the defendant’s statements is not apparent from the inspection, where the plaintiff is not competent to judge the facts without expert assistance, or where the defendant has superior knowledge about the matter in issue. See Stanley v. Limberys, 74 Nev. 109, 323 P.2d 925 (1958); Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 192 P.2d 935 (1948).” Epperson v. Roloff, 102 Nev. 206, 211–12, 719 P.2d 799, 803 (1986).
There is only a duty to investigate where there are red flags–where the hidden information is patent and obvious, and when the buyer and seller have equal opportunities of knowledge.
“Lack of justifiable reliance bars recovery in an action at law for damages for the tort of deceit. Pacific Maxon, Inc. v. Wilson, 96 Nev. 867, 870, 619 P.2d 816, 818 (1980). However, this principle does not impose a duty to investigate absent any facts to alert the defrauded party his reliance is unreasonable. Sippy v. Cristich, 4 Kan.App.2d 511, 609 P.2d 204, 208 (1980). The test is whether the recipient has information which would serve as a danger signal and a red light to any normal person of his intelligence and experience. Id. It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that the maxim of caveat emptor only applies when the defect is patent and obvious, and when the buyer and seller have equal opportunities of knowledge. Fishback v. Miller, 15 Nev. 428, 440 (1880). Otherwise, a contracting party has a right to rely on an express statement of existing fact, the truth of which is known to the party making the representation and unknown to the other party. Id. The recipient of the statement is under no obligation to investigate and verify the statement. Id.” Collins v. Burns, 103 Nev. 394, 397, 741 P.2d 819, 821 (1987).
Damages must have been proximately caused by the reliance and must be reasonably foreseeable
“with respect to the damage element, this court has concluded that the damages alleged must be proximately caused by reliance on the original misrepresentation or omission. Collins, 103 Nev. at 399, 741 P.2d at 822 (determining that an award of damages for intentional misrepresentation based on losses suffered solely due to a recession was inappropriate). Proximate cause limits liability to foreseeable consequences that are reasonably connected to both the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission and the harm that the misrepresentation or omission created. SeeGoodrich & Pennington v. J.R. Woolard, 120 Nev. 777, 784, 101 P.3d 792, 797 (2004); Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 114 Nev. 1468, 1481, 970 P.2d 98, 107 (1998).” Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 26, 426, 163 P.3d 420 (2007).
“an award of damages in a negligent-misrepresentation case includes the actual loss from the transaction plus consequential damages sustained as a proximate result of the plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentation.” Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc. v. J.R. Woolard, Inc., 120 Nev. 777, 784, 101 P.3d 792, 796 (2004).
“Chen’s skill in playing blackjack, rather than his misrepresentation of identity, was the proximate cause of his winnings. The false identification allowed Chen to receive $44,000 in chips, but it did not cause Chen to win. Thus, we hold that the Gaming Control Board’s determination that Chen committed fraud is contrary to law because the Monte Carlo did not establish all of the elements of fraud.” Chen v. Nev. State Gaming Control Bd., 116 Nev. 282, 285, 994 P.2d 1151, 1152 (2000).
“Appellants contend they should recover all their losses throughout the life of the business. We cannot agree. The district court found subsequent operating losses were solely due to a recession that devastated the Carson City area in the early 1980’s. The trial court’s determination of a question of fact will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous or not based on substantial evidence.Ivory Ranch v. Quinn River Ranch, 101 Nev. 471, 472, 705 P.2d 673, 675 (1985); NRCP 52(a). Since there is substantial evidence in the record indicating a severe economic recession in the period following the sale of the store, we will not disturb the district court’s finding that the economic climate caused subsequent losses.” Collins v. Burns, 103 Nev. 394, 399, 741 P.2d 819, 822 (1987).
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of self-protection or to subject him to association with persons likely to harm him, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them from intentionally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the [state] actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of the third persons, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
Butler ex rel. Biller v. Bayer, 168 P.3d 1055, 1063 (2007).
In cases of intentional attack, prison officials have a specific duty to protect an inmate from attack only when the attack is foreseeable. Butler ex rel. Biller v. Bayer, 168 P.3d 1055, 1063 (2007).
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