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Product Defect Case Series

Michelin N. Am., Inc. v. Deal, 128 Nev. 918 (2012).

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Although we have curtailed the use of a “mere happening” instruction in the context of res ipsa loquitor, we have never held that this instruction is limited to negligence cases only. See Carver v. El–Sabawi, 121 Nev. 11, 16, 107 P.3d 1283, 1286 (2005) (concluding that a mere happening instruction conflicts with the res ipsa loquitor presumption of negligence, and is thus a prejudicially confusing instruction). In the context of a strict liability claim, such as the case here, a plaintiff must still show evidence of a defect to bring a successful claim. See, e.g., Walker v. General Elec. Co., 968 F.2d 116, 120 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that “the malfunction theory in no way relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving a defect” (quoting Ocean Barge Transport v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands, 726 F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir.1984))). Therefore, issuance of the “mere happening” instruction would not present a similar conflict in strict liability cases, and thus, Instruction No. 27 did not misstate the law.3

Michelin N. Am., Inc. v. Deal, 128 Nev. 918 (2012)

 


Contrary to the Deals' argument, this conclusion does not conflict with our prior decision in Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp., 100 Nev. 443, 686 P.2d 925 (1984). In Stackiewicz, we held that “[w]hen there is evidence of some dangerous condition, the ‘factfinder can find, where other identifiable causes are absent, that the mere evidence of a malfunction is sufficient evidence of a defect.’ “ Id. at 449, 686 P.2d at 928 (emphasis added) (quoting Kileen v. General Motors Corp., 36 Conn.Supp. 347, 421 A.2d 874, 876 (Conn.Super.Ct.1980)). Because Stackiewicz exists as a narrow exception to general liability principles by holding that the specific cause of a malfunction need not always be shown, an inference of liability is proper under Stackiewicz only where there is no other identifiable cause for the malfunction. Id. Here, Stackiewicz did not apply because Michelin had introduced evidence showing alternative explanations of a malfunction—the tire had been punctured, improperly repaired, suffered impact, and was underinflated—all of which were potentially identifiable causes of the separated tire.4

Michelin N. Am., Inc. v. Deal, 128 Nev. 918 (2012)

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