Product Defect Case Series
Young's Mach. Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 692 P.2d 24 (1984).
Product: Unknown
Injury: Death
Mechanism of Injury: Unknown
Nature of Defect: Unknown
Jury Verdict:
- Award: $375,000
- $869,963.91 in 2016, per http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
Issue on appeal:
Product Defect Law Categories: #ComparativeNegligence
Result:
Case Quotes:
Appellant urges us to interpret this statute to include strict products liability in that class of actions in which contributory negligence may be asserted as a defense. This we refuse to do.
Young's Mach. Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 693, 692 P.2d 24, 25 (1984).
A number of cases dealing with the concept of strict products liability were before this court prior to the enactment of NRS 41.141 in July, 1973. These cases indicate that no showing of negligence is necessary in a strict products liability action. See Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 206, 484 P.2d 573 (1971); Shoshone Coca-Cola v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966). Moreover, we had recognized that the only defenses available in a strict products liability action were assumption of the risk and misuse of the product; ordinary contributory negligence was not to be considered. See General Electric Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 365, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Restatement of the Law 2d (Torts) § 402A, comments a and n.
Young's Mach. Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 694, 692 P.2d 24, 25 (1984).
Appellant alternatively contends that, even if the statute does not literally apply to strict products liability actions, the legislature's silence in this area indicates that the statute does not preclude the court's adoption of comparative fault. While it is true that this court did adopt the theory of strict products liability in Shoshone Coca-Cola v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. at 441, 420 P.2d 855, it is also true that we have consistently refused to judicially adopt principles of comparative fault or to extend such principles beyond the express legislative declaration. See Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. at 770, 602 P.2d 605; Rice v. Wadkins, 92 Nev. 631, 632, 555 P.2d 1232 (1976); Wells, Inc. v. Shoemake, 64 Nev. 57, 70, 177 P.2d 451 (1947); Cox v. L.A. & S.L.R.R. Co., 56 Nev. 510, 511, 58 P.2d 373 (1936).
Young's Mach. Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 694, 692 P.2d 24, 25 (1984).
Appellant cites numerous cases and law review articles which urge adoption of comparative fault principles in the strict products liability area as fair and equitable for all parties. It does appear that some authorities have recognized comparative fault in this area. See e.g., Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.1984); *695 Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980); Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.1979); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978) (three justices dissenting); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 Tenn.L.Rev. 171 (1974).
There is, however, substantial authority to the contrary. Not all courts are convinced of the wisdom of applying comparative fault in the strict products liability field. See e.g., Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983); Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash.2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1982); Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 37 Colo.App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976) (superseded by statute, Colo.Rev.Stat. 13–21–406); Robinson, Square Pegs (Products Liability) in Round Holes (Comparative Negligence), 52 Cal.St.B.J. 16 (1977).
It is primarily because of this great diversity of authority that we believe that this issue is one better left to the legislature. If that branch of government decides to entertain the issue, it can give full consideration to the competing interests and policies in order to devise comprehensive and well-reasoned guidelines.
Young's Mach. Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 694–95, 692 P.2d 24, 25–26 (1984).
